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Decades of research on the cognitive science of innovation have consistently implicated 
the importance of analogy during creative ideation. While the association of analogies with 
innovative design concepts is clear, more work is needed to understand the specific mechanisms 
by which analogy might help designers generate such concepts. The present work employed 
detailed analysis of the temporal interplay between analogy use and ideation in the naturalistic 
brainstorming conversations of a real-world professional design team to test between competing 
hypotheses in the literature: (1) analogy supports innovation primarily via large steps in design 
spaces during concept generation (jumps), and (2) analogy supports innovation primarily via 
small steps (incremental search). In Study 1, self-generated analogies (including distant ones) 
were not systematically associated with jumps; on the contrary, concepts tended to be more 
similar to their precedents after analogy use in comparison to baseline situations (i.e., without 
analogy use). Study 2 found that the rate of concept generation was greater when associated with 
analogy in comparison to baseline conditions, suggesting that the effects observed in Study 1 
were not due to an overall fixating effect of analogies. Overall, these results challenge the view 
that analogies help designers generate innovative concepts mainly via jumps in design spaces, 
and instead suggests that analogies primarily support incremental search. Theoretical 
implications and future directions for the cognitive science of analogy and innovation are 
discussed. 
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cognitive science of innovation, and for his invaluable guidance, encouragement and patience as 
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research questions; Bo Christensen and Linden Ball for sharing this dataset with me and 
providing feedback on the conceptualization of the study; my committee members, Tim Nokes-
Malach, Ken Kotovsky, and Jon Cagan, for lending their time and expertise to help me think 
through conceptual and methodological challenges with the work; the many industrious and 
bright research assistants, including Nick Rassler, Sophia Bender, Adam Sparacino, Matt Oriolo, 
Oreste Scioscia, and Stephen Denninger, who helped with data processing and/or coding; Tom 
Stephenson for introducing me to the science of psychology, the American Psychological 
Association, Greg Trafton, and Raj Ratwani for introducing me to cognitive science, and Joel 
Hagaman for supporting my initial forays into independent research in this field; and finally, 
God, my family, and Anna, my wife, for their unwavering support for me as a person and 
budding researcher. May this thesis be but one step in a lifetime’s journey down the unpaved 
roads of discovery. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Where do innovative design concepts come from? In decades of research on this question, 
researchers and theorists have uncovered the importance of collaboration and serendipity 
(Sawyer, 2007), incubation (Christensen & Schunn, 2005; Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, & 
Yaniv, 1995; Tseng, Moss, Cagan, & Kotovsky, 2008), sketching and design tools (Goel, 1995), 
and mental simulation (Christensen & Schunn, 2009), among others. The present work focuses 
on analogy, another relevant cognitive process. 
Analogy is a fundamental cognitive process in which a source and target domain of 
knowledge are linked to one another by a systematic mapping of attributes and relations, which 
then allows for transfer of knowledge to the target (Holyoak & Thagard, 1996). This process 
appears to be important for creative thinking in a wide variety of domains, including 
management problem-solving, politics, scientific reasoning and discovery, and artistic creation 
(Bearman, Ball, & Ormerod, 2002; Blanchette & Dunbar, 2001; Dunbar, 1997; Markman & 
Wood, 2009; Okada, Yokochi, Ishibashi, & Ueda, 2009).  
With design, too, there is substantial evidence that innovative designers often analogize 
from other domains of knowledge, such as prior design experiences, everyday artifacts, or 
biological artifacts and systems, to the design problem they are working on. Documented 
examples of innovative designs based on analogies include a retractable mast with sail designed 
by analogy to bird and bat wings, and water-filled travel weights by analogy to air mattresses 
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(Linsey, Laux, Clauss, Wood, & Markman, 2007), and George Mestral’s invention of Velcro by 
analogy to burdock root seeds, among many others. Protocol analyses of professional designers’ 
naturalistic ideation processes have also shown that analogy is a frequently used strategy, at 
approximately 11 per hour by some estimates (Ball & Christensen, 2009; Christensen & Schunn, 
2007; Dahl & Moreau, 2002). Experimental studies of design ideation have also documented 
positive impacts of analogy on novelty of design concepts (Chan et al., 2011; Dahl & Moreau, 
2002; Goldschmidt, 2001; Vargas-Hernandez, Shah, & Smith, 2010; Wilson, Rosen, Nelson, & 
Yen, 2010).  
Despite the substantial evidence linking analogy to innovative design outcomes, 
fundamental questions remain. What kinds of analogies lead to innovative concepts? At which 
points during ideation are they most helpful? And, perhaps most fundamentally, how do 
analogies actually help designers generate innovative design concepts? 
1.1 DESIGN IDEATION AS SEARCH IN A SPACE 
To gain traction with these questions, it is fruitful to first consider what the literature has to say 
about creative ideation in general. One theoretical characterization of conceptual ideation has 
been that of a search in a space (Boden, 2004; Goel & Pirolli, 1992; Perkins, 1994; Simon, 
1996). The general formulation of problem-solving as heuristic search in a problem space 
(Newell & Simon, 1972) has been applied in similarly complex domains, including theorem-
proving (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958) and scientific discovery (Klahr, 2000; Shrager & 
Langley, 1990). A problem space is defined in terms of states of problem solving, operators that 
move the problem solving from one state to another, and evaluation functions for testing the 
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difference between current states and goal states. This abstract problem space is distinguishable 
from the external task environment, and is commonly held to be represented in the problem 
solver’s internal memory (Newell & Simon, 1972). Problem solving activity includes 
formulation of the problem space and traversal of the problem space between states via 
operators, punctuated by evaluation functions that test for differences between the current state 
and the goal state. This formulation of search in a space has been extended to design in 
particular; design ideation can be construed as a constrained search in a design state space, where 
each state is a particular design configuration that can be compared against a list of design 
requirements (Campbell, Cagan, & Kotovsky, 2003; Gero & Kazakov, 1998; Goel & Pirolli, 
1992). 
Broadly, there are two forms of heuristics or operators. “Strong methods” are domain-
specific operators that considerably reduce search by taking advantage of knowledge about the 
constrained structure of the task environment. Examples include experimental paradigms in 
science and retrieval of classic move-situation pairs in chess, among others. In contrast, “weak 
methods” are domain-general but involve considerably more search, such as hill-climbing and 
means-ends analysis (Newell & Simon, 1972). Analogy can be seen as one such “weak method”. 
1.2 ANALOGY AND PATTERNS OF SEARCH 
We can now frame the question of how analogies might aid in the generation of innovative 
concepts in terms search operator character. The literature provides two conflicting answers: (1) 
analogy is primarily a “jump” search operator, and (2) analogy is primarily an incremental search 
operator. These views will be discussed in turn. 
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1.2.1 Jumps in conceptual ideation. 
One major assertion in the literature is that analogies enable “jumps” in the conceptual ideation 
space, an immediate move to a more conceptually or functionally distant region of the problem 
space. Several lines of argument support this assertion. First, theoretical accounts of analogy 
describe it as a central cognitive mechanism for bridging seemingly disparate conceptual spaces, 
enabling thinking across categories and implicit conceptual boundaries (Gentner, 2003; 
Hofstadter, 2001; Holyoak & Thagard, 1996). The process of analogy has been computationally 
described and implemented in slightly different ways among theorists, but consensus exists that 
the core process in analogy involves the alignment of disparate knowledge structures based on 
relational structure (French, 2002; Gentner & Forbus, 2011). Importantly, the power of analogy 
is most strikingly demonstrated when knowledge structures are aligned based on higher-order 
relations, such as “cause”, “enable”, or “constrain”, which can be abstracted at a high level from 
domain-specific features and objects.  
Examples of the involvement of analogy in invention and innovative design from the 
history of technology also often fit a common pattern of moving from one domain of search to 
another in one step. The novel solution to the design of boat sails was found by analogy to bat 
wings, linking the domain of sailing to the domain of biology; the solution to the need for a 
novel connective (Velcro) was found by an unexpected analogy to burdock root seeds, linking 
synthetic connectives to the domain of biology. Numerous other anectotal examples exist. 
One important thing to notice is that all of these examples involve distant analogies (i.e., 
a low degree of overlap of surface elements). These sorts of analogies are contrasted with more 
local analogies that involve a higher degree of overlap between both structural features and 
surface elements. It is often emphasized in the literature that the potential for innovative 
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outcomes is strongest when distant analogies are involved in ideation (Gentner & Markman, 
1997; Markman & Wood, 2009; Ward, 1998). Accordingly, empirical studies have found 
correlations between distant analogizing and innovative outcomes. For example, Dahl & 
Moreau's (2002) study of analogizing in professional designers discussed above showed a 
positive link between distant analogy use and rated originality of the designers’ proposed 
solutions. Similarly, Chan and colleagues (2011) showed in a study of design ideation with 
engineering design students that distant analogies were linked to increased novelty of solution 
concepts.  
One final line of evidence comes from the interest from professional engineering practice 
in formalized design-by-analogy methods, such as Synectics (Gordon, 1961)—group design 
through analogy types; French’s (1988) work on inspiration from nature; and Biomimetic 
concept generation (Hacco & Shu, 2002)—a systematic tool to index biological phenomena that 
links to textbook information. These analogy methods are seen as ways of maximizing the 
probability of generating innovative concepts. 
Given these converging lines of evidence from the theory of analogizing, history of 
technological inventions, and empirical studies, there does seem to be a case for analogy as a 
jump operator, particularly when analogical distance is high. However, there is also evidence in 
the literature for an alternative characterization of analogy’s role in innovative search, where the 
thinker employs analogy to traverse the problem space in incremental steps, the accumulation of 
which eventually results in an innovative concept. 
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1.2.2 Incremental search.  
One line of evidence for analogy as an incremental operator comes from the arguments of 
theorists analyzing the history of invention. For example, Weisberg (2009) has argued for an 
incremental view of the role of analogy in invention, pointing to examples like the Wright 
brothers’ invention of the airplane steering system by analogy to bicycles. More direct empirical 
evidence comes from Dunbar’s (1997) pioneering studies of four top-performing microbiology 
labs. His data collection and analyses focused on “on-line” thinking and reasoning during lab 
meetings. Dunbar observed major scientific discoveries (that were later published in top-tier 
journals) as they happened, and his analyses of the meetings revealed that conceptual 
transformation did not occur in single, conceptual jumps, but rather arose from an accumulation 
of smaller mutations in concepts, often fueled by numerous analogies to other experiments on the 
same organism or organisms with prominent homologies.  
A related view of analogy emerged from Okada and colleagues’ (2009) studies of the 
long-term creative processes of eminent contemporary artists. They found that their artists often 
generated novel artistic creations via an incremental process they called “analogical 
modification”, which involved generating a new target based on an existing source by modifying 
one or two key relations or objects in the mapping. For example, one artist’s creative vision was 
to explore the possibility of multiple different views of the world. His initial collection of 
artworks centered around the concept of “erasing the meaning”, where he would erase a 
character or a thing from an original piece, such as ancient Japanese picture scrolls and Bach’s 
musical notes. This artist later developed a novel collection of artworks centered on the concept 
of duplication, in which he duplicated persons or things in postcards or photographs of scenery. 
Importantly, the conceptual distance between the two artwork collections was relatively close: 
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both involved applying a single modification to an existing artwork while leaving the rest of it 
unchanged, and differed mainly in the specifics of the modification used. Okada and colleagues 
reported other case studies that followed a similar pattern.  
The process of analogical modification observed by Okada and colleagues is similar to the 
computational modeling efforts of Hofstadter and the Fluid Analogies Research Group (1995) to 
computationally model the creation of new features and concepts via “conceptual slippage”, 
where a mapping of an object A in one domain to an object B that has a different role from A in 
another domain results in a “slippage” of the objects into neighboring concepts in order to 
improve the analogical match. A similar process of re-representation of concepts exists in 
Gentner and colleagues’ computational models of analogical modification of concepts, where 
certain portions of the source knowledge structure can be modified to improve analogical match 
with the target knowledge structure, or vice versa (Gentner, 2010; Gentner et al., 1997). 
1.3 SUMMARY 
In summary, the literatures on analogy, creativity, and innovative design have collectively 
offered two alternative characterizations of the way that analogies can help designers generate 
innovative concepts during ideation. On the one hand, analogy can be viewed as primarily 
supporting mental jumps in the design space to innovative concepts. On the other hand, analogy 
can also be viewed as primarily facilitating incremental steps through promising regions of the 
design space, the accumulation of which eventually lands the designer at a portion of the design 
space much different from where s/he started. Which of these characterizations best explains the 
role of analogy in creative design ideation? It could be that analogy either primarily supports 
 8 
jumps or incremental steps, but not both. It could also be that analogy supports search by both 
jumps and incremental steps, depending on other variables, such as analogical distance and 
problem difficulty.  
As the review of evidence for either view above suggests, the literature at present still 
needs further empirical work to decide which of these characterizations is correct. Prior studies 
showing a positive effect of distant analogies on novelty of ideation have typically done so in an 
“input-output” design, where the ideation outputs of designers who are given analogies as 
stimulation are compared to those of designers who are not given analogies. The lack of “online” 
process data still leaves open the possibility that the designers in the analogy groups may be 
chaining together analogies and generated concepts to incrementally arrive at novel concepts in a 
way that is not recorded in their final recorded designs. Additionally, historical studies and 
introspective/retrospective interviews of prominent creative individuals carry the risk of 
distortion from reconstructive processes in retrospection and introspection. Finally, online 
studies of the creative process have not measured and analyzed analogy use and ideation search 
patterns together. The purpose of the present work was to assist in addressing this gap in the 
literature via detailed analyses of the online interplay between analogy and ideation processes of 
real-world professional designers. 
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2.0  STUDY 1 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
Detailed analyses were conducted on the temporal interplay between analogy use and 
ideation events in the naturalistic brainstorming conversations of a real-world professional 
design team. The team was tasked with developing a new product concept for a hand-held 
application of thermal printing technology for children. These conversations unfolded over the 
course of two design team meetings; the first meeting lasted 1 hour and 37 minutes, and focused 
on mechanical design sub-problems; the second meeting lasted 1 hour and 40 minutes, and 
focused on electronics sub-problems. The design team comprised 7 professionals from different 
design sub-disciplines, including one from electronics and business development, four from 
mechanical engineering, one from business consulting, one from ergonomics and usability, and 
one from industrial design and project management.  
The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate two alternative hypotheses about whether 
analogy use was associated more with jumps or incremental steps in the functional distance of 
concepts during concept generation:  
Hypothesis 1a: The functional distance of a proposed concept from concepts recently 
considered will be reliably greater when preceded by analogies vs. baseline, i.e., when 
not preceded by analogies.  
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Hypothesis 1b: The functional distance of a proposed concept from concepts recently 
considered will not be reliably greater when preceded by analogies vs baseline. 
It should be noted here that, given the naturalistic character of the data, ideation search patterns 
following analogy is not compared with standard “control” no input conditions, but more 
precisely against functional distance of search when the designers were not using analogies; 
other solution generating strategies were more than likely being employed, such as reasoning 
from first principles and mutation of existing concepts (Ullman, 2002). 
2.2 METHODS 
2.2.1 Segmentation. 
Analysis was conducted on the transcribed audio from the two meetings. Transcripts were 
segmented into lines by utterances, such that each line contained a separate thought; in this 
segmentation, a single sentence or speaker turn could span multiple lines. The segmentation 
procedure resulted in a total of 4,594 lines, 2,382 in the first meeting, and 2,212 in the second. 
2.2.2 Coding. 
2.2.2.1 Analogy use. 
Coding of analogy use was conducted by a prior research team, whose findings have been 
published in Ball and Christensen (2009). Analogies were coded at the sentence/turn level, but 
tagged at the line level, meaning that analogies often spanned multiple lines. Sentences were 
 11 
coded as analogies any time a designer referred to another source of knowledge and attempted to 
transfer concepts from that source to the target domain. 144 analogies were found across the 2 
transcripts (79 in the first and 65 in the second), with an inter-rater reliability of (Cohen’s kappa) 
k = .77.  
Analogies were coded for both distance and purpose. Following previous work examining 
analogical distance (Ball & Christensen, 2009; Christensen & Schunn, 2007), distance was coded 
at two levels: local analogies involved mappings from sources that related to tools, mechanisms 
and processes associated with graphical production and printing, while distant analogies 
involved mappings from more distant sources (see Tables 1 and 2). Of the 144 analogies found, 
16% were coded as local, and 84% were coded as distant. Inter-rater reliability was very high, k 
= .99. 
Table 1. Example of local analogy 
976 Alan the other thing to to think about is 
977  in almost all cases when I look at pens the apart from re-wired sort of 
micropens the th- tip is actually the narrowest part of the product 
978  whereas in what we're looking at it could actually be as wide or wider- 
 
Table 2. Example of distant analogy 
1520 Tommy like a garage door type of thing 
1521 Todd yeah push the button 
1522  then it goes open 
 
 
Following previous work (Ball & Christensen, 2009; Blanchette & Dunbar, 2001; 
Christensen & Schunn, 2007), analogical purpose (i.e., the goal or function of the analogy) was 
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coded at 3 levels, with a 4th level added as a theoretical contribution by Ball and Christensen 
(2009; see Tables 3-6 for examples): (1) Problem identification - noticing a possible problem in 
the emerging design, where the problem was taken from an analogous source domain, (2) 
Concept generation - transferring possible design concepts from the source domain to the target 
domain, (3) Explanation - using a concept from the source domain to explain some aspect of the 
target domain to members of the design team, and (4) Function-finding - active mapping of new 
functions to the design form currently being developed (i.e., a thermal printing pen). Inter-rater 
reliability for this coding scheme was high, k = .85. 
 
Table 3. Example of problem identification analogy 
1204 Alan in fact in some ways we should think about the fact it isn't even a 
pen 
1205  because a pen you you'll always learn to write from left to right 
1206  whether you're left handed or right handed 
1207  so actually what you end up doing with left handed people is you 
smudge over over your work 
1208  which is a problem  
1209  but actually with this you're dragging it  
1210  you're not pushing it are you  
1211  most people will drag it 
 
Table 4. Example of concept generation analogy 
1520 Tommy like a garage door type of thing 
1521 Todd yeah push the button 
1522  then it goes open 
1523  yeah 
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Table 5. Example of explanation analogy 
213 Tommy yeah this is a bit like photographic paper in a way  
214  where you're erm developing what's on the paper 
215  whereas here you're just enabling the bits you need to print 
216  so here you're kind of getting in to normal text 
 
Table 6. Example of function-finding analogy 
1160 Todd um that's intriguing 
1161  sort of like a like a could be like a finger puppe couldn't it 
1162 Sandra yeah cos wearing it like a finger puppet – 
1163  the feel of it might be fun 
1164 Todd exactly so you can make you can make the footprints- 
 
2.2.2.2 Concepts. 
Three coders, including the author and two trained research assistants, identified generated 
solutions and then the sub-problems they were intended to address. Similar to the coding of 
analogy use, solutions were coded conceptually at the sentence/turn level, but tagged at the line 
level. Sentences/turns were coded as concept proposals any time a designer described a proposal 
for how to accomplish some design sub-problem, where a design sub-problem was defined as 
either (1) something the device (or a sub-system of it) has to do for the user (e.g., print, teach 
how to write, keep user’s hands safe, make learning fun, make it harder to mess up, etc.), or (2) 
something the device or sub-system has to do to support or enable other functions (e.g., keep the 
print head level so that the print head mechanism can work). Defining concepts at the sub-
problem level provided external validity to the coding scheme, given the primary focus on 
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conceptual ideation processes, since ideation in professional engineering practice routinely 
occurs following decomposition of an overall design problem into sub-problems which are then 
addressed iteratively, sometimes in tandem (Ullman, 2002) 
To avoid tagging of concept discussion lines as concept generation instances, only 
utterances that explicitly participated in a description of how a concept is meant to work were 
tagged as part of a concept; neither utterances evaluating concepts nor mere mentions of 
concepts (e.g., “that ‘sheath idea’ you mentioned earlier”) were tagged as part of concepts unless 
they were embedded within a sentence or turn describing a concept. Identification of concepts 
utterances was done at an acceptable level of reliability: averaged k across the three coders was 
.72. 
To provide a further constraint on identification of concept utterances, coders also 
simultaneously proposed a segmentation for a coherent group of concept utterances into intact 
concepts, and also proposed a pairing with one more sub-problems the concept was intended to 
address. Segmentation and pairing of concept utterances was then finalized by discussion during 
consensus meetings involving all three coders. In total, 217 unique concepts proposed for 42 sub-
problems were identified. Examples of sub-problems included “keep the print head level”, 
“specific application concept of product”, “protect the print head”, “power/energy saving”, “user 
interface for controlling print options”, “prevent overheating”, “keep print head clean”, “form of 
media”, and “make device work for left-handed users”.  
 Table 7 provides an example of a proposed design concept for the sub-problem “keep the 
print head level”. This sub-problem was a major one discussed by the designers, and 35 distinct 
concepts were proposed for addressing it. The core of this sub-problem was that the thermal 
printing technology required that the thermal print head interfaced with the printing media within 
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a strict range of angles in order for printing performance to be acceptable, and that the target 
market for the product concept, i.e., young children between the ages of 5 and 7, were judged as 
particularly unlikely to hold pens and writing devices in stable ways. 
 
Table 7. Example concept for “keep the print head level” 
690 Alan (  ) can I just explore that last one in a little more detail  
691  because when organisations- making sure they can only be correct in 
one way  
692  so the design and shape of the thing so it can only be done in one way 
693  and that’s the correct way  
694  because then there is less sort of learning to be done by the user  
 
The solution proposed in Table 7 was essentially a forcing function that would (via the 
shape of the device) force a particular way of holding the device that would ensure appropriate 
angles of contact. 
2.2.3 Constructing ideation spaces. 
To characterize the designers’ search patterns during ideation, it was necessary to first 
characterize the search spaces. Since functional distance of concepts within the search space was 
the focus, a functional similarity space for concepts within each sub-problem space was 
constructed via pairwise comparison ratings of functional distance for each concept in each sub-
problem space. That is, within each sub-problem space (e.g., “keep the print head level”), all 
concepts generated by the designers were rated for functional distance from all other concepts 
addressing the same sub-problem.  
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Two senior engineering undergraduate students conducted the pairwise ratings of 
functional distance. Functional distance between pairs of concepts was rated on a scale ranging 
from 1 to 5. Distance coding was conceptualized as a degree of overlap rating, with the following 
anchor points: 1 = very similar (very substantial overlap, only trivial differences), 2 = somewhat 
similar (substantial overlap, but some nontrivial differences), 3 = somewhat different (some 
overlap, some differences), 4 = (little overlap, numerous differences), and 5 = radically different 
(very minimal/trivial overlap).  
The coding procedure was as follows. For each sub-problem space, the two coders 
together first looked through the list of proposed concepts in the space, and discussed and came 
to a consensus on an initial set of important points of contrast for comparing solutions. For 
example, for concepts proposed for the sub-problem “keep the print head level”, one point of 
contrast was “user vs. device-centric approach (e.g., user-centric would be “give feedback to user 
and user adjusts accordingly”, vs. “device has suspension system that adjusts for user action 
automatically”). Next, the coders independently generated functional distance ratings for all 
pairwise comparisons within the sub-problem space, using the points of contrast as a guide for 
their judgments. The final step involved computations of inter-rater agreement and discussion of 
disagreements greater than 1-point difference; differences of 1-point were averaged to produce a 
final distance rating. Inter-rater reliability was very good, with a mean inter-correlation of r = .80 
across sub-problem spaces.  
It should be noted that not all concepts entered into the analysis. Because the current 
analysis was focused on movement within an ideation space, sub-problems with less than 4 
proposed concepts were excluded. The final set of concepts for analysis included 135 proposed 
concepts for 9 major sub-problems (see Table 8). 
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Table 8. Sub-problems by number of concepts 
Sub-problem # concepts 
Keep the print head level 35 
Specific application concept of product 35 
Protect the print head 29 
Acquiring print patterns 9 
Powering the device 7 
User interface for controlling print options 6 
Varying print options available to user 6 
Ensure print head only fires when on media 5 
Maintain appropriate surface area of contact 
between print head and media 
3 
 
2.2.4 Analysis: Measures and model parameters. 
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) models were employed to test the hypotheses, where 
each concept was the unit of analysis, with functional distance from prior reference point as the 
dependent measure and a 3-level “analogy before” between-subjects measure (“no analogy”, 
“distant problem solving analogy”, and “other analogy”). 
Two prior solution reference points were employed: (1) minimum distance from prior 5 
concepts, and (2) distance from the just-prior concept. The two reference points provide 
complementary views of the designers’ patterns of ideation search. The first reference point 
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provided a stricter measure of jumps through the ideation space, since a given concept would 
have a high “distance from reference point” value if and only if it was substantially functionally 
different from all of the 5 solutions that immediately preceded it. The second reference point 
provided a more circumscribed measure of jumps, since a concept could have a high “distance 
from reference point” value if it was substantially functionally different from the solution that 
immediately preceded it, but functionally similar to the concepts prior to that one. For example, 
suppose the designers generated 5 concepts consecutively (C1, C2, C3, C4, and C5). C5 would 
receive a high “distance from reference point” value if it was substantially different from C4, 
even if it was functionally similar to C1, C2, and C3.  
To thoroughly explore the space of possibilities for the effects of analogy, the “analogy 
before” measure was created at 3 different time windows: 5 lines, 10 lines, and 20 lines prior to 
the solution onset. Number of lines rather than time per se was chosen as the segmentation unit 
of analysis because the focus was on information exchange and cognitive processes, which could 
happen at varying rates with respect to the passage of time per se. This range of time window 
sizes reflected our focus on relatively immediate effects of analogy on ideation.  
The process of creating the “analogy before” measure for each of the time windows was 
identical and was as follows. For each concept, its initial onset in the transcript was identified. 
Next, the lines (either 5, 10, or 20, depending on time window setting) prior to the onset were 
scanned to determine whether any of those lines contained at least part of an analogy/analogies, 
keeping separate track of distance and purpose of these analogy/analogies. With this 
information, each concept was classified as one of three groups: “no analogy”, “distant problem 
solving analogy”, and “other analogy”, where “distant problem solving analogies” included all 
analogies that were both distant and either coded as concept generation or function-finding. The 
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number of concepts in each “analogy before” level by time window and reference point are 
shown in Table 9.  
 
Table 9. Number of concepts in each “analogy before” condition by time window and reference point type 
 Min distance from last 5 Distance from just prior 
 
No 
analogy 
Distant 
problem 
solving 
analogy 
Other 
analogy 
No 
analogy 
Distant 
problem 
solving 
analogy 
Other 
analogy 
Last 5 lines 73 24 6 95 30 10 
Last 10 lines 59 33 11 80 38 17 
Last 20 lines 45 39 19 63 45 27 
 
The reason for singling out distant concept generation or function-finding analogies was 
twofold: (1) to reduce noise from analogies not expected to contribute directly to concept 
generation (i.e., explanation and problem identification analogies), and (2) to provide a stronger 
test of Hypothesis 1a, since the literature provides stronger support for the hypothesis that distant 
analogies would support jumps. It should be noted that, given the varying time window sizes, 
some concepts were preceded by multiple analogies. In these cases, the concept in question was 
assigned to conditions based on the predominant distance and purpose of the analogies; more 
specifically, a solution was assigned to the “distant solution generating analogy” condition if and 
only if the majority of the analogies (i.e., more than half) were distant and either concept-
generating or function-finding.  
 20 
2.3 RESULTS 
Separate ANOVAs were run for the two “distance from reference point” dependent measure 
types for each of the time window sizes. Descriptive statistics for each reference point and time 
window combination are shown in Table 10.  
 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics for distance from reference point measures by “analogy before” condition and time 
window 
 Min distance from last 5 Distance from just prior 
 
No 
analogy 
Distant 
problem 
solving 
analogy 
Other 
analogy 
No 
analogy 
Distant 
problem 
solving 
analogy 
Other 
analogy 
Last 5       
Mean 2.0 2.2 2.0 3.1 2.7 3.1 
SE 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.4 
Last 10       
Mean 2.1 2.1 1.3 3.3 2.6 2.8 
SE 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Last 20       
Mean 2.1 2.1 2.0 3.2 2.9 2.9 
SE 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 
 
Overall, no ANOVAs found a significant positive effect of distant solution generating 
analogies on either dependent measure. First, the ANOVAs on “minimum distance from last 5” 
showed no reliable effect of the “analogy before” measure at either the 5 line window, F (2, 100) 
= .10, p = .91, the 10 line window, F (2, 100) = .53, p = .60, or the 20 line time window, F (2, 
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100) = .06, p = .95. With respect to the “distance from just prior” measure, the ANOVAs 
showed no reliable effect at either the 5 line window, F (2, 132) = 1.29, p = .28, or the 20 line 
window, F (2, 132) = .64, p = .53. In contrast, the ANOVA for the 10 line window showed a 
reliable effect of the “analogy before” measure on “distance from just prior”, F (2, 132) = 6.140, 
p = .03, η2 = .051. However, the nature of the effect was contrary to the initial hypothesis; 
concepts following distant problem solving analogies tended to be significantly less distant from 
their immediate predecessors in comparison to baseline conditions (no analogy before), Cohen’s 
d = -0.51 (95% confidence interval = -0.22 to -0.91) p = .03 (Bonferroni corrections for multiple 
comparisons). Post-hoc pairwise contrasts showed that only solutions following distant problem 
solving analogies differed significantly from baseline (no analogy before). 
 
 
Figure 1. Distance from just prior by “analogy before” condition and time window. * denotes a statistically 
significant contrast at p < .05. 
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While the ANOVAs for the other time window sizes were not significant, Figure 1 shows 
that the mean trends in the 5-line window were in the same direction, i.e., less distance from just 
prior following distant problem solving analogies vs. baseline. The trend was similar but 
considerably muted in the 20-line window. 
Figure 2 shows the frequency distribution of concepts at 5 functional distance cut-off 
points (using mean distance for each concept across raters), with the concepts at each cut-off 
point divided into three groups: (1) new concepts (in white) not preceded in the last 10 lines by 
any analogy, (2) new concepts (in light gray) preceded in the last 10 lines by analogies other than 
distant problem solving analogies, and (3) new concepts (in dark gray) preceded in the last 10 
lines by distant problem solving analogies. 
 
 
Figure 2. Frequency distribution of concepts at 5 functional distance cut-off points. Percentage values on 
top of each column denote the proportion of concepts at that cut-off point associated with distant problem solving 
analogies. 
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Four insights can be gleaned from inspecting this frequency distribution. First, attending 
to the overall summed bars, we can see that jumps are fairly common overall. Second, attending 
to the white bars alone, we can see that jumps are the most common search step when concepts 
closely associated with analogies in time are ignored. Third, focusing only on the concepts 
preceded by distant problem solving analogies (dark gray), incremental steps are almost twice as 
common as jumps (18 concepts with distance < 2 vs. 10 concepts with distance > 3). Finally, 
attending to the percentage values on each bar, we can see that distant problem solving analogies 
disproportionately account for most incremental steps (35% and 50% of concepts at the first two 
cut-off points) and relatively few jumps (19% and 16% of concepts at the last two cut-off 
points). 
2.4 DISCUSSION 
Overall, the results of the analysis in this study were two-fold: (1) rather than being associated 
with larger steps in the design concept space (mental jumps), analogies tended to be associated 
with more incremental moves, and (2) this effect of analogy appeared to be circumscribed in a 
relatively tight temporal boundary, i.e., distant problem solving analogies recently considered (in 
the last 10 lines) appear to lead to more continuous search vs. baseline conditions.  
There are at least two explanations for this counter-hypothesis set of findings. First, 
analogies might have had an overall fixating effect on ideation, suppressing not just novel 
concepts but concept generation in general. There are two related notions of fixation in the 
design and creativity literature: one notion has to do with an inability to generate concepts that 
are significantly different from ones already considered (Jansson & Smith, 1991; Smith, Ward, & 
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Schumacher, 1993); another notion involves difficulty generating any concept at all, a sort of 
inverse of ideational fluency, an important and frequently measured component of creative 
thought (Guilford, 1950; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Runco, 2004; Shah et al., 2003). The 
inverse forms of these two kinds of fixations – being able to generate very different ideas, and 
ideational fluency – are often correlated, suggesting that they may be components of a more 
encompassing fixation effect. For example, the fluent generation of numerous concepts has been 
empirically associated with an increased probability of finding exceptional concepts (Guilford, 
1950; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Runco, 2004; Shah, Vargas-Hernandez, & Smith, 2003). 
Also, increased feature transfer from examples during ideation has been associated with 
decreased levels of fluency (Chan et al., 2011). In light of this compound notion of fixation, if 
analogy use in the current dataset was associated with both kinds of fixation, there would be 
more support for an interpretation of Study 1’s results in terms of an aggregate fixation effect. 
On the other hand, if analogy use was associated with decreased functional distance only, but not 
decreased fluency, then a different inference might be drawn; it could be argued that analogy 
does not necessarily fixate per se, but rather is employed as a means of incrementally exploring 
promising regions of the design space. That is, rather than serving as “jumping points” into new 
regions of the solution space, analogies might be employed as a means of exploring currently 
considered regions of the space. Study 2 was conducted to generate evidence to decide between 
these alternative explanations. 
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3.0  STUDY 2 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
Study 2 examined whether analogy use was associated with a lower rate of concept generation 
relative to baseline levels. To address this question, a time-lagged logistic regression was 
employed; time-lagged, because this analysis would estimate the change in concept generation at 
time t and t+1 based on patterns of analogy use at time t, and logistic because the outcome 
variable was binary (i.e., did a designer generate a concept or not). This analysis assumed that (1) 
there was some baseline probability of a concept being generated in a given time slice, and (2) a 
decrease in this probability as a function of the presence of an analogy in the current or previous 
time slice would suggest that analogies were a significant source of fixation for these designers. 
3.2 METHODS 
3.2.1 Creating blocks. 
The first step in the analysis was to segment the transcript into blocks for the time-lagged 
analysis. Given the indications from Study 1 that the effects of analogy use on ideation in this 
dataset were circumscribed to approximately within 10 lines of an analogy, block sizes of 5-lines 
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and 10-lines were used to explore the space of possible analogy effects. The block creation 
process was the same for each of these block sizes, and was as follows. First, a coherent cluster 
of analogy utterances was identified and marked as its own block (recall that analogies could 
span multiple lines). Next, the n (5 or 10) lines before and after each analogy block were 
segmented into two additional blocks (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Analogy-centered block creation strategy 
 
The rest of the transcript was broken up into successive n-line blocks, each ending at the 
nth line, or with the next analogy block. This block creation strategy resulted in 157 analogy 
blocks and 801 non-analogy 5-line blocks, 428 non-analogy 10-line blocks. The reason for the 
discrepancy between the number of analogy blocks and the number of unique analogies 
identified in the transcript is that analogies sometimes re-entered the conversation at later times. 
Analogy block lengths ranged from 1 line to 28 lines (M = 5.1, SD = 4.7), with most (88%) 
analogy blocks being 10 lines or less. 
Analogy onsets and offsets were used as boundary markers for blocks because the focus 
is on providing an estimate of the effects of analogy, which should be most directly shown when 
closely time-locked to analogies. 
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3.2.2 Measures and model parameters. 
Separate one-predictor time-lagged logistic regression models, with “analogy now” (yes/no) as 
the predictor and “solution onset next” (yes/no) as the outcome variable, were run on the 5-line, 
10-line, and 20-line block sets; for each block size setting, separate models were run with lags of 
0 and 1 were selected, such that analogy use (present/absent) in one block predicted (1) the 
generation of a concept in the current block (lag 0), and (2) the generation of a concept in the 
subsequent block (lag 1). Using only lags 0 and 1 focuses on immediate consequences that best 
fits the hypotheses under test, and reduces the probability of finding spurious correlations from 
examining multiple lags. 
The analogy measure was a binary variable measuring whether or not any concept 
generation or function finding analogy was present in the block (yes or no). Problem 
identification and explanation analogies were excluded because these analogies were not 
expected to contribute directly to solution generation. The concept generation measure was also a 
binary variable measuring whether or not a new concept onset was present in the block (yes or 
no); that is, a block was coded as “solution = yes” if and only if it contained an onset of a 
concept that was not mentioned in previous blocks. This ensured that the analysis would more 
cleanly reflect effects of analogies on the generation (vs. elaboration) of concepts. Similar to 
Study 1, concept generation rates associated with analogy were not compared with a traditional 
baseline, but rather with conditions in which cognitive processes other than analogy were being 
employed. 
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3.3 RESULTS 
The odds ratios for each model block size setting and lag are summarized in Table 11. The 
models for the 10-line blocks did not show statistically reliable decreases in concept generation 
as a function of analogy use for either lag 0 or lag 1 relative to “baseline. For the 10-line blocks, 
the overall lag 0 model was not significant, χ2 (1, N = 585) = .16, p = .70, Negelkerke R2 = .000, 
and the analogy coefficient, β = 0.10, odds ratio = 1.10, was also not significant, Wald χ2 (1) = 
.85, p = .36. The overall lag 1 model was also not significant, χ2 (1, N = 585) = 1.24, p = .27, 
Negelkerke R2 = .003, and the analogy coefficient, β = 0.26, odds ratio = 1.30, was not 
significant, Wald χ2 (1) = 1.26, p = .26. 
 
Table 11. Odds ratios by block size and lag type 
Block size Lag 0 Lag 1 
10 1.10 1.30 
5 2.09** 1.87* 
Note: ** denotes p < .01; * denotes p < .05 
 
The models for the 5-line blocks also did not show statistically reliable decreases in 
concept generation as a function of analogy use for either lag; on the contrary, analogy use was 
reliably associated with an increase in concept generation rate relative to baseline conditions, 
i.e., when designers were engaging in processes other than analogy. For lag 0, the overall model 
was significant, χ2 (1, N = 403) = 9.14, p = .00, Negelkerke R2 = .015, and the analogy 
coefficient, β = 0.74, odds ratio = 2.09, indicated that analogy use was associated with an 
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approximately 110% increase in the odds of a concept being generated in the same block, 
relative to other processes the designer might otherwise be engaged in. This coefficient was 
significant, Wald χ2 (1) = 9.85, p = .00. Similarly, for lag 1, the overall model was significant, χ2 
(1, N = 403) = 6.41, p = .01, Negelkerke R2 = .011, and the analogy coefficient, β = 0.63, odds 
ratio = 1.87, indicated that analogy use was associated with an approximately 87% increase in 
the odds of a concept being generated in the next block, relative to other processes the designer 
might otherwise be engaged in. This coefficient was significant, Wald χ2 (1) = 6.87, p = .01.   
3.4 DISCUSSION 
Taken together, the results of the models provided no support for the hypothesis that distant-
concept-generating and function-finding analogies decrease fluency of ideation. On the contrary, 
the odds ratios from both the 10-line and 5-line block models were in a positive direction, and 
the coefficients in the 5-line models were significant. Thus, rather than decreasing fluency of 
ideation, the use of distant, concept generating and function-finding analogies appeared to 
support increased rates of concept generation, even when compared to other processes the 
designers might have been engaged in. These results do not support an interpretation of Study 1’s 
results in terms of aggregate fixating effects on ideation, and instead support an interpretation in 
terms of analogy supporting exploration of potentially promising but already visited regions of 
the design space. 
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4.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
4.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In summary, two studies were conducted to unpack in detail the effects of analogy use on 
ideation search patterns in the naturalistic conversations of a real-world professional design 
team. Study 1 showed that the use of analogy, specifically distant concept generating and 
function-finding analogies, was not associated with increased functional distance of proposed 
concepts from their predecessors. In fact, there was converging evidence that analogy use was 
temporally associated with decreased functional distance of search. Study 2 further tested 
whether analogies in this dataset had an overall fixating effect or whether the analogies were 
primarily used as operators for exploring previously visited regions of the design space. The 
results showed that analogy did not have a fixating effect. Thus, combining the results of Studies 
1 and 2 suggests that analogy, even when analogical distance is high, is primarily associated with 
incremental traversal of the design space. 
To illustrate the nature of these effects, I present two examples. In Table 12, the designers 
are searching for ways to protect the print head from being damaged by unexpected contact when 
the device is not printing, exploring a space of possible retractable covers for the print head. Two 
analogies are employed to generate two distinct variations on this solution approach: Concept 61 
involves a mechanism similar to a video tape flap with a rigid flap that opens to release the print 
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head for use, while Concept 62 involves a mechanism similar to a rolling garage door. The 
connection between these solution concepts and the analogies that generated them should be 
clear, as should be the relatively high degree of functional similarity between the two solution 
concepts.  
Table 12. Example progression in solution exploration involving analogy 
Analogy: Video tape flap 
1516 Todd I’m thinking of something a bit like erm the flap on a video tape 
1517  (pause) 
1518 Alan uh-huh what the flap? 
1519 Todd yeah 
Analogy: Garage door 
1520 Tommy like a garage door type of thing 
Concept 61 
1521 Todd yeah push the button 
1522  then it goes open 
1523 Tommy yeah 
1524 Todd but that’s probably overly complicated 
Concept 61 
1525 Rodney garage door well it could be a roller 
1526 Todd a roller door 
 
In Table 13, the designers are searching for solutions to the problem of maintaining the 
optimal angle of contact between the print head and the media, given that the target users are 
young children who are unlikely to hold the printing device still to achieve that angle of contact 
without some help.  
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Table 13. Another example progression in solution exploration involving analogy 
Concept 24 
693 Alan so the design and shape of the thing so it can only be done in one way 
693  and that’s the correct way 
694  because then there is less sort of learning to be done by the user 
Concept 25 
729 Alan you could even have some sort of feedback 
730  in terms of colour LEDs on the pen saying that he’s done a good job or she’s done 
a good job or- 
Analogy: DIY laser levellers 
729 Alan because the other thing that you use to make sure things are level that’s come out in 
the sort of DIY world is these laser levelers and things like that 
Concept 281 
779 Alan if you had like a little laser that made sure it was level of some sort 
780  erm you know the child can actually see a line 
781  and that its at the right angle then 
782  because they can see that the line is right 
783  and then that would work- 
 
The designer proposes Concept 24, which involves designing the shape of the device 
such that it forces the user to hold it in the “correct” way (i.e., in a way that preserves the 
optimum angle of contact between the print head and the media). Again, as in Table 12, the 
analogy was a direct source of Concept 28, which advanced the search in the design space 
incrementally by changing the way the feedback would be provided to the user, while retaining 
key functional features from Concept 25. Together, these extracts illustrate how analogy was a 
                                                 
1 Solutions were actually sequential in the sub-problem space, but numbering is not sequential because 
solutions to other sub-problems were discussed in between solution 25 and the analogy 
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significant source of concepts, which tended to be incremental explorations in the design space, 
rather than large functional jumps. 
4.2 CAVEATS 
Some caveats should be mentioned before discussing the broader implications of this work. First, 
the present experimental approach involved a tradeoff between external and internal validity. 
While the naturalistic character of the data and the fact that the designers are real-world 
professionals lends external validity to the findings, it should be noted that the findings are 
correlational in nature, and tight experimental control of potential confounding variables was not 
possible. A related caveat has to do with the tradeoff between depth and breadth; the data 
collection, coding and analytic methods employed in the present work, while affording highly 
detailed looks at the temporal interplay between analogy use and ideation processes, are highly 
resource intensive, making comparisons across multiple expert datasets difficult. From one 
perspective, the sample size of the two studies was essentially N = 1, given that only one team 
comprised the totality of the data studied. For this reason, the present findings should be 
replicated with similar studies of other design teams before any strong conclusions can be drawn 
or generalized. Nevertheless, the high external validity of the data does provide some initial 
confidence that the findings will be robust across different design teams in similar creative 
situations.  
Finally, the analogies in this dataset were primarily self-generated; that is, with just a few 
exceptions, most of the analogies were retrieved from the designers’ memories. The few 
analogies that might have been retrieved from external sources were those generated prior to the 
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first meeting; a meeting brief was sent around to the team prior to the first meeting, advising the 
designers of the major issues to be discussed in the two meetings (e.g., the angle problem, 
protecting the print head), and instructing the team members to bring to the meeting products or 
designs that have to glide smoothly over contours, to help kick-start ideation for the angle 
problem. The primarily self-generated character of the analogies stands in contrast to the 
externally given analogies in many of the prior studies of analogy in design. In light of this, one 
possible explanation for the continuous character of ideation search supported by analogy might 
be that many of the analogies were insufficiently distant from previously considered concepts, 
perhaps due to the constraints of human memory retrieval; one of the most robust findings on 
analogical retrieval from memory is that it is often driven by surface similarity (for reviews, see 
Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1994; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997). 
However, the vast majority of analogies in this dataset (84%) were distant, i.e., drawn 
from domains other than graphical production and printing devices. This accords with the 
arguments and data of researchers who have argued that, notwithstanding human memory’s 
preferences for surface similarity during retrieval, individuals in naturalistic situations are able to 
prolifically retrieve analogies from memory based on deep structural similarity (Blanchette & 
Dunbar, 2000; Dunbar, 2001). Nevertheless, the present findings raise interesting questions 
about whether the characteristics of human memory constrain the range of functional distance of 
analogies retrieved from memory. That is, it is possible that, given the computational constraints 
of analogy (e.g., preferring systematic matches, one-to-one mappings; Gentner, 1983) and the 
associative character of memory, designers might not be able to retrieve from memory other 
concepts that solve similar sub-problems in very different ways, especially if these concepts are 
embedded within designs or products with very different overall functionality. Different effects 
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of analogy on ideation search patterns might be observed with externally-provided analogous 
sources that are highly distant functionally.  
4.3 IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Overall, the current data support a characterization of (self-generated) analogy as primarily an 
incremental search operator during creative ideation. Combining these findings with the large 
body of evidence linking analogy to creative outcomes suggests that a major route via analogies 
to innovative concepts runs through an accumulation of incremental development of concepts, 
much like the process described by Dunbar (1997) and Weisberg (2009). This characterization of 
creative ideation does not necessarily rule out the occurrence of creative jumps in ideation 
spaces; it merely elevates the importance of fluency of ideation and incremental development of 
concepts.  
However, jumps may sometimes be necessary. Perkins (1994) has described a potential 
“isolation problem” in creative problem spaces, where innovative solutions are bounded in the 
space by wildernesses of no promise. In these situations, incremental search may lead to an 
impasse, since there is no incremental path into the location of the innovative solution that avoids 
going through highly unpromising options. It may be that large jumps into these isolated regions 
of promise might be facilitated by highly functionally distant analogies, perhaps sparked by 
external stimulations. This notion is supported by the literature on incubation and “prepared 
mind” effects, where creative problem solvers overcome impasses in their problem solving by 
unexpectedly encountering potentially relevant ideas in their environment after having set their 
problem aside (Christensen & Schunn, 2005; Seifert et al., 1995; Tseng et al., 2008). These ideas 
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suggest that impasses may be a prerequisite for observing jumps supported by analogy. Given 
that impasses were not observed in the current data, it may be premature to conclude that 
analogies in general do not function as jump operators. 
 Together, these observations in tandem with the current findings suggest a more refined 
resolution of the conflicting views of analogy as primarily supporting jumps or incremental 
search. It may be that analogies retrieved from memory serve as “workhorses” that enable 
designers and other creative problem solvers to incrementally traverse their problem spaces, and 
that externally provided analogies enable jumps out of local maxima in impasse situations. 
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